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歐巴馬總統預定下周提出振興經濟的新措施，我希望是大膽而且有實質內容的，因為共和黨不管如何都會反對，這樣他就可以指出誰在阻礙真正的行動。但讓我們把政治擺一邊，來談談我們過去20個月真正從經濟政策學到什麼。
當歐巴馬提議最初的8,000億美元財政刺激方案時，有兩群批評者都宣稱失業率將居高不下，但他們舉的原因卻大不相同。
其中一群幾乎吸引所有注意的批評者說，刺激方案規模太大，而且會帶來災難。如果你讀2009年初華爾街日報的輿論版，就會不斷看到歐巴馬的計畫將導致利率飆漲和通膨飛揚的說法。
另一群包括本人在內的批評者則警告，從當時可能的經濟預測判斷，方案的規模太小。我在2009年2月指出，國會預算處（CBO）預測接下來兩年的經濟會出現2.9兆美元的缺口；一套8,000億美元的方案（一部分是減稅）就是無法填滿那個缺口。
第二個陣營的批評者特別擔心今年的發展，因為刺激方案會在2009年底出現對成長的最大效應，然後逐漸淡出。去年，許多人已警告經濟可能在2010年下半陷於停滯。
那麼實際情況又如何？政府的樂觀預測錯了，但哪一群悲觀者說對了錯的原因？
先看利率。說刺激方案太大的人預測利率會大漲。當2009年初利率上揚時，華爾街日報刊出一篇標題為「債券義勇軍：美國決策者的制裁者回來了」的社論，宣稱原因就是對赤字的恐懼，並作結論說，「在疑惑時，要相信市場」。
但說刺激方案太小的人認為，只要經濟仍然不景氣，暫時的赤字不是問題；我們仍有許多無處可去的儲蓄。我們說，利率會隨著對未來成長的樂觀或悲觀而擺盪，而非隨著政府的舉債。
在疑惑時，要相信市場。華爾街日報刊登那篇社論時，10 年期公債殖利率超過3.7%；現在已降至還不到2.7%。
通膨呢？在2009年初的通膨恐懼氛圍中，認為刺激不足的批評者指出，通膨在持續的高失業期間總是下跌，這次也不會例外。果然，通膨的主要指標已從經濟危機前的2%，降至現在的不到1%，且日本式的通縮可能性已愈來愈高。
另一方面，近來經濟成長減緩的時機強烈支持刺激方案確實提振了經濟的說法：成長在去年刺激達到預期影響高峰時加速，隨後也一如預期跟著刺激效應消退而減緩。
還有，別告訴我德國證明了正確的作法是財政節約，而不是刺激方案。德國實際上採取了許多刺激措施—所有節約都在將來。德國也未出現房市泡沫破滅。儘管有這些條件，德國國內生產毛額（GDP）比較危機前的高峰差距仍大於美國GDP 。沒錯，德國在就業方面表現較佳，但這是因為強大的工會和政府政策不允許美國式的大裁員。
所以，2009-2001年給我們的教訓就是，刺激方案錯誤是嚇人的故事，以及採用刺激方案確實有效。但採用的規模不夠大，所以我們還需要另一回合刺激方案。
我知道再來一回合不太可能：共和黨和保守派民主黨人不會支持。而如果共和黨一如預期在11月期中選舉大勝，將被視為反刺激立場獲得普遍支持。我們將聽到，歐巴馬過分偏左，他的凱因斯經濟教條證明是錯的。
但政治決定誰擁有權力，而非誰站在真理這邊。歐巴馬刺激方案背後的經濟理論已成功通過近來事件的測試；遺憾的是，就經濟問題的規模來看，歐巴馬（不管基於什麼原因—我了解他有許多政治包袱）一開始提出的計畫太過謹慎。
因此，正如我前面說的，希望歐巴馬下周寧大勿小。如果他這麼做，他將站在事實這邊。
Next week, President Obama is scheduled to propose new measures to boost the economy. I hope they’re bold and substantive, since the Republicans will oppose him regardless — if he came out for motherhood, the G.O.P. would declare motherhood un-American. So he should put them on the spot for standing in the way of real action.
But let’s put politics aside and talk about what we’ve actually learned about economic policy over the past 20 months.
When Mr. Obama first proposed $800 billion in fiscal stimulus, there were two groups of critics. Both argued that unemployment would stay high — but for very different reasons.
One group — the group that got almost all the attention — declared that the stimulus was much too large, and would lead to disaster. If you were, say, reading The Wall Street Journal’s opinion pages in early 2009, you would have been repeatedly informed that the Obama plan would lead to skyrocketing interest rates and soaring inflation.
The other group, which included yours truly, warned that the plan was much too small given the economic forecasts then available. As I pointed out in February 2009, the Congressional Budget Office was predicting a $2.9 trillion hole in the economy over the next two years; an $800 billion program, partly consisting of tax cuts that would have happened anyway, just wasn’t up to the task of filling that hole.
Critics in the second camp were particularly worried about what would happen this year, since the stimulus would have its maximum effect on growth in late 2009 then gradually fade out. Last year, many of us were already warning that the economy might stall in the second half of 2010.
So what actually happened? The administration’s optimistic forecast was wrong, but which group of pessimists was right about the reasons for that error?
Start with interest rates. Those who said the stimulus was too big predicted sharply rising rates. When rates rose in early 2009, The Wall Street Journal published an editorial titled “The Bond Vigilantes: The disciplinarians of U.S. policy makers return.” The editorial declared that it was all about fear of deficits, and concluded, “When in doubt, bet on the markets.”
But those who said the stimulus was too small argued that temporary deficits weren’t a problem as long as the economy remained depressed; we were awash in savings with nowhere to go. Interest rates, we said, would fluctuate with optimism or pessimism about future growth, not with government borrowing.
When in doubt, bet on the markets. The 10-year bond rate was over 3.7 percent when The Journal published that editorial; it’s under 2.7 percent now.
What about inflation? Amid the inflation hysteria of early 2009, the inadequate-stimulus critics pointed out that inflation always falls during sustained periods of high unemployment, and that this time should be no different. Sure enough, key measures of inflation have fallen from more than 2 percent before the economic crisis to 1 percent or less now, and Japanese-style deflation is looking like a real possibility.
Meanwhile, the timing of recent economic growth strongly supports the notion that stimulus does, indeed, boost the economy: growth accelerated last year, as the stimulus reached its predicted peak impact, but has fallen off — just as some of us feared — as the stimulus has faded.
Oh, and don’t tell me that Germany proves that austerity, not stimulus, is the way to go. Germany actually did quite a lot of stimulus — the austerity is all in the future. Also, it never had a housing bubble that burst. And with all that, German G.D.P. is still further below its precrisis peak than American G.D.P. True, Germany has done better in terms of employment — but that’s because strong unions and government policy have prevented American-style mass layoffs.
The actual lessons of 2009-2010, then, are that scare stories about stimulus are wrong, and that stimulus works when it is applied. But it wasn’t applied on a sufficient scale. And we need another round.
I know that getting that round is unlikely: Republicans and conservative Democrats won’t stand for it. And if, as expected, the G.O.P. wins big in November, this will be widely regarded as a vindication of the anti-stimulus position. Mr. Obama, we’ll be told, moved too far to the left, and his Keynesian economic doctrine was proved wrong.
But politics determines who has the power, not who has the truth. The economic theory behind the Obama stimulus has passed the test of recent events with flying colors; unfortunately, Mr. Obama, for whatever reason — yes, I’m aware that there were political constraints — initially offered a plan that was much too cautious given the scale of the economy’s problems.
So, as I said, here’s hoping that Mr. Obama goes big next week. If he does, he’ll have the facts on his side.
當歐巴馬提議最初的8,000億美元財政刺激方案時，有兩群批評者都宣稱失業率將居高不下，但他們舉的原因卻大不相同。
其中一群幾乎吸引所有注意的批評者說，刺激方案規模太大，而且會帶來災難。如果你讀2009年初華爾街日報的輿論版，就會不斷看到歐巴馬的計畫將導致利率飆漲和通膨飛揚的說法。
另一群包括本人在內的批評者則警告，從當時可能的經濟預測判斷，方案的規模太小。我在2009年2月指出，國會預算處（CBO）預測接下來兩年的經濟會出現2.9兆美元的缺口；一套8,000億美元的方案（一部分是減稅）就是無法填滿那個缺口。
第二個陣營的批評者特別擔心今年的發展，因為刺激方案會在2009年底出現對成長的最大效應，然後逐漸淡出。去年，許多人已警告經濟可能在2010年下半陷於停滯。
那麼實際情況又如何？政府的樂觀預測錯了，但哪一群悲觀者說對了錯的原因？
先看利率。說刺激方案太大的人預測利率會大漲。當2009年初利率上揚時，華爾街日報刊出一篇標題為「債券義勇軍：美國決策者的制裁者回來了」的社論，宣稱原因就是對赤字的恐懼，並作結論說，「在疑惑時，要相信市場」。
但說刺激方案太小的人認為，只要經濟仍然不景氣，暫時的赤字不是問題；我們仍有許多無處可去的儲蓄。我們說，利率會隨著對未來成長的樂觀或悲觀而擺盪，而非隨著政府的舉債。
在疑惑時，要相信市場。華爾街日報刊登那篇社論時，10 年期公債殖利率超過3.7%；現在已降至還不到2.7%。
通膨呢？在2009年初的通膨恐懼氛圍中，認為刺激不足的批評者指出，通膨在持續的高失業期間總是下跌，這次也不會例外。果然，通膨的主要指標已從經濟危機前的2%，降至現在的不到1%，且日本式的通縮可能性已愈來愈高。
另一方面，近來經濟成長減緩的時機強烈支持刺激方案確實提振了經濟的說法：成長在去年刺激達到預期影響高峰時加速，隨後也一如預期跟著刺激效應消退而減緩。
還有，別告訴我德國證明了正確的作法是財政節約，而不是刺激方案。德國實際上採取了許多刺激措施—所有節約都在將來。德國也未出現房市泡沫破滅。儘管有這些條件，德國國內生產毛額（GDP）比較危機前的高峰差距仍大於美國GDP 。沒錯，德國在就業方面表現較佳，但這是因為強大的工會和政府政策不允許美國式的大裁員。
所以，2009-2001年給我們的教訓就是，刺激方案錯誤是嚇人的故事，以及採用刺激方案確實有效。但採用的規模不夠大，所以我們還需要另一回合刺激方案。
我知道再來一回合不太可能：共和黨和保守派民主黨人不會支持。而如果共和黨一如預期在11月期中選舉大勝，將被視為反刺激立場獲得普遍支持。我們將聽到，歐巴馬過分偏左，他的凱因斯經濟教條證明是錯的。
但政治決定誰擁有權力，而非誰站在真理這邊。歐巴馬刺激方案背後的經濟理論已成功通過近來事件的測試；遺憾的是，就經濟問題的規模來看，歐巴馬（不管基於什麼原因—我了解他有許多政治包袱）一開始提出的計畫太過謹慎。
因此，正如我前面說的，希望歐巴馬下周寧大勿小。如果他這麼做，他將站在事實這邊。
===========================================================================
Next week, President Obama is scheduled to propose new measures to boost the economy. I hope they’re bold and substantive, since the Republicans will oppose him regardless — if he came out for motherhood, the G.O.P. would declare motherhood un-American. So he should put them on the spot for standing in the way of real action.
But let’s put politics aside and talk about what we’ve actually learned about economic policy over the past 20 months.
When Mr. Obama first proposed $800 billion in fiscal stimulus, there were two groups of critics. Both argued that unemployment would stay high — but for very different reasons.
One group — the group that got almost all the attention — declared that the stimulus was much too large, and would lead to disaster. If you were, say, reading The Wall Street Journal’s opinion pages in early 2009, you would have been repeatedly informed that the Obama plan would lead to skyrocketing interest rates and soaring inflation.
The other group, which included yours truly, warned that the plan was much too small given the economic forecasts then available. As I pointed out in February 2009, the Congressional Budget Office was predicting a $2.9 trillion hole in the economy over the next two years; an $800 billion program, partly consisting of tax cuts that would have happened anyway, just wasn’t up to the task of filling that hole.
Critics in the second camp were particularly worried about what would happen this year, since the stimulus would have its maximum effect on growth in late 2009 then gradually fade out. Last year, many of us were already warning that the economy might stall in the second half of 2010.
So what actually happened? The administration’s optimistic forecast was wrong, but which group of pessimists was right about the reasons for that error?
Start with interest rates. Those who said the stimulus was too big predicted sharply rising rates. When rates rose in early 2009, The Wall Street Journal published an editorial titled “The Bond Vigilantes: The disciplinarians of U.S. policy makers return.” The editorial declared that it was all about fear of deficits, and concluded, “When in doubt, bet on the markets.”
But those who said the stimulus was too small argued that temporary deficits weren’t a problem as long as the economy remained depressed; we were awash in savings with nowhere to go. Interest rates, we said, would fluctuate with optimism or pessimism about future growth, not with government borrowing.
When in doubt, bet on the markets. The 10-year bond rate was over 3.7 percent when The Journal published that editorial; it’s under 2.7 percent now.
What about inflation? Amid the inflation hysteria of early 2009, the inadequate-stimulus critics pointed out that inflation always falls during sustained periods of high unemployment, and that this time should be no different. Sure enough, key measures of inflation have fallen from more than 2 percent before the economic crisis to 1 percent or less now, and Japanese-style deflation is looking like a real possibility.
Meanwhile, the timing of recent economic growth strongly supports the notion that stimulus does, indeed, boost the economy: growth accelerated last year, as the stimulus reached its predicted peak impact, but has fallen off — just as some of us feared — as the stimulus has faded.
Oh, and don’t tell me that Germany proves that austerity, not stimulus, is the way to go. Germany actually did quite a lot of stimulus — the austerity is all in the future. Also, it never had a housing bubble that burst. And with all that, German G.D.P. is still further below its precrisis peak than American G.D.P. True, Germany has done better in terms of employment — but that’s because strong unions and government policy have prevented American-style mass layoffs.
The actual lessons of 2009-2010, then, are that scare stories about stimulus are wrong, and that stimulus works when it is applied. But it wasn’t applied on a sufficient scale. And we need another round.
I know that getting that round is unlikely: Republicans and conservative Democrats won’t stand for it. And if, as expected, the G.O.P. wins big in November, this will be widely regarded as a vindication of the anti-stimulus position. Mr. Obama, we’ll be told, moved too far to the left, and his Keynesian economic doctrine was proved wrong.
But politics determines who has the power, not who has the truth. The economic theory behind the Obama stimulus has passed the test of recent events with flying colors; unfortunately, Mr. Obama, for whatever reason — yes, I’m aware that there were political constraints — initially offered a plan that was much too cautious given the scale of the economy’s problems.
So, as I said, here’s hoping that Mr. Obama goes big next week. If he does, he’ll have the facts on his side.
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