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愛爾蘭是歐洲邊陲的海島國家，人口只有四百多萬，缺乏自然資源，農業產品受到英國財團剝削。直到一九九○年代，因為全球科技產業的興起，微軟、戴爾、ＩＢＭ、惠普這些美國的大型科技公司，發覺位在歐洲最西邊的愛爾蘭具有多項吸引人的特質，包括非常低廉的工資與土地價格，只有一四％的超低企業所得稅率，充沛的英語專業人才，以及愛爾蘭加入歐盟、享有通往歐盟市場的暢通管道。美國科技公司於是將愛爾蘭定位為通往歐洲市場的跳板，紛紛設立客戶服務中心、電腦組裝廠、軟體授權與銷售中心。
原本邊緣化的愛爾蘭，加入了跨國公司的全球網路，突然成了歐洲的科技生產重鎮。根據ＯＥＣＤ（經濟合作發展組織）的統計，全歐洲銷售的套裝軟體，有超過五 ○％來自愛爾蘭，有二五％的個人電腦，是在愛爾蘭組裝後再銷入歐盟市場。當時不論是英國的《經濟學人》、美國的《紐約時報》，都盛讚愛爾蘭經濟成功轉型，從貧窮的邊陲國家，成為歐盟平均國民所得第二高的富國奇蹟。
全球金融風暴前，愛爾蘭經濟風光無比，1996至2007年，愛爾蘭平均年經濟成長率高達7.2%，且這段期間該國年年預算赤字維持在國內生產毛額（GDP）3%以下，符合歐盟財政紀律要求上限，在歐元區始終是模範生。沒人想到愛爾蘭今年預算赤字會高達GDP的32%。
房市綁架銀行 銀行綁架政府
愛爾蘭從模範生淪落到討救兵，全是房地產泡沫破滅引起。簡單來說，是房市綁架了銀行，銀行又綁架了政府，終至讓政府陷入主權債務危機。愛爾蘭總理柯文於愛爾蘭經濟大好時出任財長，政府2008年開始出手救銀行，國家連三年負成長也是出自他的決策，面對指責只有接受。
在經濟繁榮的十幾年間，愛爾蘭房地產泡沫不斷膨脹。1995年至2007年，愛爾蘭房價飆漲3至4倍，房地產業占GDP比重，也從5%升到10%，房地產從業人口是1993年的兩倍，達到13.3%，房地產蔚然成為愛爾蘭經濟命脈。
經濟成長推動房價本是自然的事，但因房貸條件過度寬鬆而政府欠缺警覺，房地產市場槓桿偏高，終於在2008年全球金融危機爆發時泡沫破滅。愛爾蘭房價如今已從高點暴跌五成，銀行房貸大筆壞帳，拖垮金融體系後，政府出手救銀行，卻救到深陷泥淖，黯然接受紓困。
由銀行大舉放貸至建商撐起，長達 10 年的房產榮景的破滅，也讓愛爾蘭陷入自 1947 年以來最慘的衰退。自 2007 年 9 月而始，商業房產價格下降 59%IMF 數據顯示，2008 年時，愛爾蘭經濟衰退幅度達 3.5%，去年更糟，降幅達 7.6%。今年則稍微止血，降幅為 0.3%。愛爾蘭 10 月失業率飆高至 13.6%。
高盛首席歐洲經濟家尼爾森（Erik Nielsen）21日指出，愛爾蘭需要650億歐元支持未來3年的財政，以及300億歐元援助銀行。
總部位在加州巴羅艾托（Palo Alto）的惠普（Hewlett-Packard）指出，愛爾蘭為了換紓困金而調高目前為12.5%的企業稅率，惠普將重新考慮在愛爾蘭的投資。
惠普愛爾蘭營運負責人亞歷山大（LionelAlexander）接受彭博電視專訪指出：「惠普明白表示，企業稅若上調，將重新檢討對愛爾蘭的投資。愛爾蘭的超低企業稅是吸引我們進駐的原因之一，因此必需將此納入協商考量之一。」
德國政府發言人塞伯特（Steffen Seibert）昨天在柏林指出，愛爾蘭必需遵守「苛刻的」條件以換取金援，且應考慮上調企業稅率。
愛爾蘭紓困金額佔其GDP比重將高達60%，相對希臘為47%。
============================================
Published Nov 22 2010
By Derek Thompson
The IMF and European Union have come together to offer Ireland more than $100 billion, enough to cover the country's borrowing costs for the immediate future to keep the country from defaulting on its debt.
What's the meaning of this implosion? Here are two interesting takes.
It proves the failure of supply-side economics, says BusinessWeek's Chris Farrell:
In the 1980s and 1990s, Ireland started cutting taxes, and in the 1990s and 2000s it was growing at a phenomenal rate. The top marginal tax rate on personal income went from 65 percent in 1984 to 42 percent by 2000. More importantly, the corporate tax rate was cut in stages from 50 percent in 1986 to 12.5 percent by 2003. Ireland posted an average growth rate of more than 7 percent a year from 1997 to 2007, the quickest pace among the 30-plus members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Ireland was the Celtic Tiger, the Irish Miracle.
By now, everyone in the global economy is aware that the Celtic Tiger has been declawed and the Irish Miracle a mirage. Ireland is an economic and financial disaster with a government budget deficit for 2010--including the cost of bailing out its banks--at 32 percent of gross domestic product.
This is an interesting but insufficient explanation. A fine paper explaining Ireland's Credit Bubble, linked to within the BusinessWeek piece, pins the Irish collapse on a failure of bank prudence -- a familiar story to US readers where rampant private lending, rising property values, and historic consumer debt inflates the economy before finally giving way. The concept of tax rates doesn't appear once in the paper. That doesn't mean that ultra-low rates didn't play a role in attracting risky capital into Ireland, but the Irish Central Bank could and should have curbed Ireland's appetite for debt, no matter what the marginal tax rates were.
Another theory says Ireland proves that distinguishing between public and private debt in crises is worthless, writes Alen Mattich in the Wall Street Journal:
In Greece, the massive burden of domestic debt threatened to bring down the economy not just because it threatened to squeeze the Greek taxpayer dry (were the government ever to manage to enforce its tax laws), but also because domestic banks were holding a massive supply of that same debt. A sovereign default would have wiped out Greek banks' assets, crushing the country's financial sector.
In Ireland, the problem worked the other way around. When Ireland's banks were threatened by depositor runs during the early days of the credit crunch, the government stepped in to guarantee the sector's liabilities. A huge burden of private-sector Irish debt suddenly became public.
To understand why this is such a problem, cast yourself in the role of international investor. You need surefire ways to evaluate the dependability of a country's debt if you're going to buy it. One year, you look at countries like England, Ireland, and Spain and see low public debt levels. Good bet! But suddenly, Ireland's private debt bubble explodes and the private debt bubble becomes the country's public debt crisis. And Ireland's public debt crisis becomes Germany and Britain's bailout. In short, one country's private guarantees become another country's public guarantees.
That's the crisis beneath Europe's crisis. In the Eurozone, each country is responsible for the survival of its members states. That means when Ireland and Greece go south, the effects ripple across the Eurozone. In the short term, the EU's only move is to slow down the break up of its peripheral states. But in the long run, the peripheral states might have no choice but to break up the EU.
========================================
By Chris Farrell
Published November 21, 2010, 8:56PM EST
The global darling of supply-side economics was Ireland. The island nation was a European backwater for decades, a poor, depressed nation best known for its millions emigrating and for Guinness Stout. But in the 1980s and 1990s, Ireland started cutting taxes, and in the 1990s and 2000s it was growing at a phenomenal rate. The top marginal tax rate on personal income went from 65 percent in 1984 to 42 percent by 2000. More importantly, the corporate tax rate was cut in stages from 50 percent in 1986 to 12.5 percent by 2003. Ireland posted an average growth rate of more than 7 percent a year from 1997 to 2007, the quickest pace among the 30-plus members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Ireland was the Celtic Tiger, the Irish Miracle.
By now, everyone in the global economy is aware that the Celtic Tiger has been declawed and the Irish Miracle a mirage. Ireland is an economic and financial disaster with a government budget deficit for 2010—including the cost of bailing out its banks—at 32 percent of gross domestic product. The nation's embattled government under Prime Minister Brian Cowen is negotiating the terms of a bailout from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund.
The significance of Ireland for public policy goes far beyond the tragedy of the nation. Ireland should signal the death knell of the lets-welcome-all-tax-cuts and the-market-will-take-care-of-the-rest recipe of supply-side economics that gained political prominence starting in the 1970s. Ireland is also a warning to those in Congress who believe cutting taxes and deregulating financial services is the path back to prosperity.
Yes, the logic behind supply-side economics is simple and persuasive. Lower tax rates give entrepreneurs, management, and workers an incentive to expand business, invest more, and log additional hours by raising the after-tax rate of return. In Ireland's case, the economy benefited from its close proximity to Europe and the U.K., which made it easy for the low corporate tax rate to attract foreign capital. "Everyone agrees that there are benefits to lower tax rates," says Daniel Shaviro, tax professor at New York University law school. Adds Varadarajan V. Chari, professor of economics at the University of Minnesota: "By offering very favorable tax treatment, it could attract a lot of capital relative to the size of the country."
But the gains didn't materialize just from becoming a supply-side tax haven. Ireland devoted large resources to turn its education system into a world-class one. Its intellectual property laws and research and development incentives encouraged technological innovation. Similarly, although supply-siders sing the economic praises of the Reagan tax cuts, the effect is exaggerated (and Reagan raised taxes in 1982, '83, and '84). Far more important was Paul Volcker and the tough monetary policy he initiated that set a three-decade cycle of disinflation in motion. So were Michael Milken, Henry Kravis, T. Boone Pickens, and other finance buccaneers of the era. Technological innovation flourished, too, especially with corporate America's embrace of the personal computer in the '80s and the Internet in the '90s.
Problem is, incentives can also work against you. "Where they failed is also where the U.S. and the U.K. failed," says Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, a research fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, D.C. "They believed the market would take care of itself, and that isn't true. The banks have been poorly regulated." Adds Chari: "The supply-siders are right to emphasize incentives, but I don't see why they don't see that incentives can work in socially perverse ways."
Certainly, that's what happened in Ireland. Regulators were nowhere to be found during the real estate-centered credit bubble. The Irish Central Bank did not have a history of independence from government and after joining the euro zone contented itself with gathering statistics and issuing currency, according to Morgan Kelly, economist at University College, Dublin. (Kelly's paper, "The Irish Credit Bubble," can be read here.) The banking industry also captured government. Kelly notes that politicians and financiers knew each other well in the small nation. The employment boom generated by bank lending—especially in the construction industry—generated a "natural alliance of interests among politicians, developers, and banks," he writes.
When it comes to generating economic growth, there's no simple blueprint (just ask the Obama Administration). Tax incentives matter. But supply-side economics has deteriorated into a mantra in which cuts are needed all the time to keep the economy growing. But there is no free lunch. Tax cuts coupled with a deregulated financial sector is a recipe for disaster. Ireland is paying the price. Let's hope Congress remembers Ireland as it debates fiscal policy.
=====================================================
Published 2010 Nov 27
By Paul Krugman
原本邊緣化的愛爾蘭，加入了跨國公司的全球網路，突然成了歐洲的科技生產重鎮。根據ＯＥＣＤ（經濟合作發展組織）的統計，全歐洲銷售的套裝軟體，有超過五 ○％來自愛爾蘭，有二五％的個人電腦，是在愛爾蘭組裝後再銷入歐盟市場。當時不論是英國的《經濟學人》、美國的《紐約時報》，都盛讚愛爾蘭經濟成功轉型，從貧窮的邊陲國家，成為歐盟平均國民所得第二高的富國奇蹟。
全球金融風暴前，愛爾蘭經濟風光無比，1996至2007年，愛爾蘭平均年經濟成長率高達7.2%，且這段期間該國年年預算赤字維持在國內生產毛額（GDP）3%以下，符合歐盟財政紀律要求上限，在歐元區始終是模範生。沒人想到愛爾蘭今年預算赤字會高達GDP的32%。
房市綁架銀行 銀行綁架政府
愛爾蘭從模範生淪落到討救兵，全是房地產泡沫破滅引起。簡單來說，是房市綁架了銀行，銀行又綁架了政府，終至讓政府陷入主權債務危機。愛爾蘭總理柯文於愛爾蘭經濟大好時出任財長，政府2008年開始出手救銀行，國家連三年負成長也是出自他的決策，面對指責只有接受。
在經濟繁榮的十幾年間，愛爾蘭房地產泡沫不斷膨脹。1995年至2007年，愛爾蘭房價飆漲3至4倍，房地產業占GDP比重，也從5%升到10%，房地產從業人口是1993年的兩倍，達到13.3%，房地產蔚然成為愛爾蘭經濟命脈。
經濟成長推動房價本是自然的事，但因房貸條件過度寬鬆而政府欠缺警覺，房地產市場槓桿偏高，終於在2008年全球金融危機爆發時泡沫破滅。愛爾蘭房價如今已從高點暴跌五成，銀行房貸大筆壞帳，拖垮金融體系後，政府出手救銀行，卻救到深陷泥淖，黯然接受紓困。
由銀行大舉放貸至建商撐起，長達 10 年的房產榮景的破滅，也讓愛爾蘭陷入自 1947 年以來最慘的衰退。自 2007 年 9 月而始，商業房產價格下降 59%IMF 數據顯示，2008 年時，愛爾蘭經濟衰退幅度達 3.5%，去年更糟，降幅達 7.6%。今年則稍微止血，降幅為 0.3%。愛爾蘭 10 月失業率飆高至 13.6%。
高盛首席歐洲經濟家尼爾森（Erik Nielsen）21日指出，愛爾蘭需要650億歐元支持未來3年的財政，以及300億歐元援助銀行。
總部位在加州巴羅艾托（Palo Alto）的惠普（Hewlett-Packard）指出，愛爾蘭為了換紓困金而調高目前為12.5%的企業稅率，惠普將重新考慮在愛爾蘭的投資。
惠普愛爾蘭營運負責人亞歷山大（LionelAlexander）接受彭博電視專訪指出：「惠普明白表示，企業稅若上調，將重新檢討對愛爾蘭的投資。愛爾蘭的超低企業稅是吸引我們進駐的原因之一，因此必需將此納入協商考量之一。」
德國政府發言人塞伯特（Steffen Seibert）昨天在柏林指出，愛爾蘭必需遵守「苛刻的」條件以換取金援，且應考慮上調企業稅率。
愛爾蘭紓困金額佔其GDP比重將高達60%，相對希臘為47%。
============================================
Published Nov 22 2010
By Derek Thompson
The IMF and European Union have come together to offer Ireland more than $100 billion, enough to cover the country's borrowing costs for the immediate future to keep the country from defaulting on its debt.
What's the meaning of this implosion? Here are two interesting takes.
It proves the failure of supply-side economics, says BusinessWeek's Chris Farrell:
In the 1980s and 1990s, Ireland started cutting taxes, and in the 1990s and 2000s it was growing at a phenomenal rate. The top marginal tax rate on personal income went from 65 percent in 1984 to 42 percent by 2000. More importantly, the corporate tax rate was cut in stages from 50 percent in 1986 to 12.5 percent by 2003. Ireland posted an average growth rate of more than 7 percent a year from 1997 to 2007, the quickest pace among the 30-plus members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Ireland was the Celtic Tiger, the Irish Miracle.
This is an interesting but insufficient explanation. A fine paper explaining Ireland's Credit Bubble, linked to within the BusinessWeek piece, pins the Irish collapse on a failure of bank prudence -- a familiar story to US readers where rampant private lending, rising property values, and historic consumer debt inflates the economy before finally giving way. The concept of tax rates doesn't appear once in the paper. That doesn't mean that ultra-low rates didn't play a role in attracting risky capital into Ireland, but the Irish Central Bank could and should have curbed Ireland's appetite for debt, no matter what the marginal tax rates were.
Another theory says Ireland proves that distinguishing between public and private debt in crises is worthless, writes Alen Mattich in the Wall Street Journal:
In Greece, the massive burden of domestic debt threatened to bring down the economy not just because it threatened to squeeze the Greek taxpayer dry (were the government ever to manage to enforce its tax laws), but also because domestic banks were holding a massive supply of that same debt. A sovereign default would have wiped out Greek banks' assets, crushing the country's financial sector.
In Ireland, the problem worked the other way around. When Ireland's banks were threatened by depositor runs during the early days of the credit crunch, the government stepped in to guarantee the sector's liabilities. A huge burden of private-sector Irish debt suddenly became public.
To understand why this is such a problem, cast yourself in the role of international investor. You need surefire ways to evaluate the dependability of a country's debt if you're going to buy it. One year, you look at countries like England, Ireland, and Spain and see low public debt levels. Good bet! But suddenly, Ireland's private debt bubble explodes and the private debt bubble becomes the country's public debt crisis. And Ireland's public debt crisis becomes Germany and Britain's bailout. In short, one country's private guarantees become another country's public guarantees.
That's the crisis beneath Europe's crisis. In the Eurozone, each country is responsible for the survival of its members states. That means when Ireland and Greece go south, the effects ripple across the Eurozone. In the short term, the EU's only move is to slow down the break up of its peripheral states. But in the long run, the peripheral states might have no choice but to break up the EU.
========================================
By Chris Farrell
Published November 21, 2010, 8:56PM EST
The global darling of supply-side economics was Ireland. The island nation was a European backwater for decades, a poor, depressed nation best known for its millions emigrating and for Guinness Stout. But in the 1980s and 1990s, Ireland started cutting taxes, and in the 1990s and 2000s it was growing at a phenomenal rate. The top marginal tax rate on personal income went from 65 percent in 1984 to 42 percent by 2000. More importantly, the corporate tax rate was cut in stages from 50 percent in 1986 to 12.5 percent by 2003. Ireland posted an average growth rate of more than 7 percent a year from 1997 to 2007, the quickest pace among the 30-plus members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Ireland was the Celtic Tiger, the Irish Miracle.
By now, everyone in the global economy is aware that the Celtic Tiger has been declawed and the Irish Miracle a mirage. Ireland is an economic and financial disaster with a government budget deficit for 2010—including the cost of bailing out its banks—at 32 percent of gross domestic product. The nation's embattled government under Prime Minister Brian Cowen is negotiating the terms of a bailout from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund.
The significance of Ireland for public policy goes far beyond the tragedy of the nation. Ireland should signal the death knell of the lets-welcome-all-tax-cuts and the-market-will-take-care-of-the-rest recipe of supply-side economics that gained political prominence starting in the 1970s. Ireland is also a warning to those in Congress who believe cutting taxes and deregulating financial services is the path back to prosperity.
Yes, the logic behind supply-side economics is simple and persuasive. Lower tax rates give entrepreneurs, management, and workers an incentive to expand business, invest more, and log additional hours by raising the after-tax rate of return. In Ireland's case, the economy benefited from its close proximity to Europe and the U.K., which made it easy for the low corporate tax rate to attract foreign capital. "Everyone agrees that there are benefits to lower tax rates," says Daniel Shaviro, tax professor at New York University law school. Adds Varadarajan V. Chari, professor of economics at the University of Minnesota: "By offering very favorable tax treatment, it could attract a lot of capital relative to the size of the country."
But the gains didn't materialize just from becoming a supply-side tax haven. Ireland devoted large resources to turn its education system into a world-class one. Its intellectual property laws and research and development incentives encouraged technological innovation. Similarly, although supply-siders sing the economic praises of the Reagan tax cuts, the effect is exaggerated (and Reagan raised taxes in 1982, '83, and '84). Far more important was Paul Volcker and the tough monetary policy he initiated that set a three-decade cycle of disinflation in motion. So were Michael Milken, Henry Kravis, T. Boone Pickens, and other finance buccaneers of the era. Technological innovation flourished, too, especially with corporate America's embrace of the personal computer in the '80s and the Internet in the '90s.
Problem is, incentives can also work against you. "Where they failed is also where the U.S. and the U.K. failed," says Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, a research fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, D.C. "They believed the market would take care of itself, and that isn't true. The banks have been poorly regulated." Adds Chari: "The supply-siders are right to emphasize incentives, but I don't see why they don't see that incentives can work in socially perverse ways."
(The secrete of rising real estate price ! )
Certainly, that's what happened in Ireland. Regulators were nowhere to be found during the real estate-centered credit bubble. The Irish Central Bank did not have a history of independence from government and after joining the euro zone contented itself with gathering statistics and issuing currency, according to Morgan Kelly, economist at University College, Dublin. (Kelly's paper, "The Irish Credit Bubble," can be read here.) The banking industry also captured government. Kelly notes that politicians and financiers knew each other well in the small nation. The employment boom generated by bank lending—especially in the construction industry—generated a "natural alliance of interests among politicians, developers, and banks," he writes.
When it comes to generating economic growth, there's no simple blueprint (just ask the Obama Administration). Tax incentives matter. But supply-side economics has deteriorated into a mantra in which cuts are needed all the time to keep the economy growing. But there is no free lunch. Tax cuts coupled with a deregulated financial sector is a recipe for disaster. Ireland is paying the price. Let's hope Congress remembers Ireland as it debates fiscal policy.
=====================================================
Published 2010 Nov 27
By Paul Krugman
愛爾蘭上周末同意接受紓困，但事實上是藉承諾採取更多撙節措施來換取信用額度，好為自己爭取更多時間。市場並不領情：愛爾蘭債券殖利率進一步攀高。
現在看來，愛爾蘭的情況比冰島還不如。冰島的經濟衰退及失業情況比愛爾蘭輕微，看來更有機會踏上復甦之路。
部分原因在於冰島讓借錢給本國銀行的海外貸方為自己的誤判付出代價，而非由納稅人擔保民間壞帳。
愛爾蘭已第三年採行撙節措施，但信心仍不斷流失。嚴肅之人不知道何時才會意識到，由老百姓承擔銀行家過錯乃罪大惡極。
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